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Abstract
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4612
Notwithstanding the tariffication component of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, import tariffs 
on farm products continue to provide an incomplete 
indication of the extent to which agricultural producer 
and consumer incentives are distorted in national 
markets. Especially in developing countries, non-
agricultural policies indirectly impact agricultural and 
food markets. Empirical analysis aimed at monitoring 
distortions to agricultural incentives thus need to 
examine both agricultural and non-agricultural policy 
measures including import or export taxes, subsidies 
and quantitative restrictions, plus domestic taxes or 
This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
to understand the extent, causes and economic effects of government distortions to agricultural incentives in developing 
countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at Wmartin1@worldbank.org or mchester@worldbank.org.  
subsidies on farm outputs or inputs and consumer 
subsidies for food staples. This paper addresses the 
practical methodological issues that need to be faced 
when attempting to undertake such a measurement task 
in developing countries. The approach is illustrated in 
two ways: by presenting estimates of nominal and relative 
rates of assistance to farmers in China for the period 
1981 to 2005; and by summarizing estimates from an 
economy-wide computable general equilibrium model of 
the effects on agricultural versus non-agricultural markets 
of the project’s measured distortions globally as of 2004.Measuring Distortions to Agricultural 
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Governments have intervened in food and other agricultural markets for millennia, 
particularly via trade policies.
1 Attempts are often made to justify the interventions on 
economic, social or environmental grounds, but mostly such trade measures are welfare 
reducing – both in the country applying them and in the rest of the world – relative to 
more direct first-best policy instruments for achieving those domestic policy objectives of 
society (Bhagwati 1971; Corden 1997). Through distorting the incentives producers and 
consumers would otherwise face, they are also welfare-redistributing and inherently 
discriminatory. 
Those welfare-reducing and redistributing properties ensure government 
regulations are the focus of a great deal of attention at home and abroad. In the 
international arena, food-exporting countries are concerned with access to markets in 
food-importing countries and unfair competition in third-country markets from subsidized 
food exporters, while food-importing countries are concerned with foreign competition in 
their home market. In the domestic setting, myriad groups are concerned with the 
efficiency, equity, employment, environmental, poverty, etc. consequences of such 
measures. Both reform-focused and protectionist domestic groups, as well as foreign 
traders and trade negotiators, are therefore keen to understand better the reasons behind 
and effects of such distortions to incentives. The first step to improving that 
understanding involves measuring the extent of distortions to incentives faced in each 
country by farmers, agribusiness firms, food consumers, and traders. 
   Many observers thought the Uruguay Round of GATT trade negotiations, which 
led to the Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994, would make the task much easier 
via ‘tariffication’: the transforming of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to food and other 
                                                 
1 The Greek island of Thasos in the second millennium B.C., for example, allowed exports of only those 
wines sealed with the name of the magistrate. Ostensibly this was to guarantee authenticity, but in addition 
it allowed the taxation of exports (Robinson 1994, p. 465). For an excellent review of the myriad food 
regulations as they affect global trade currently, see Josling, Roberts and Orden (2004).    2
agricultural imports into tariffs (import taxes) which are inherently more transparent and 
simpler to negotiate (Winters 1987). With that came minimum market access 
requirements, which manifest themselves in the form of lower or zero tariffs on agreed 
quantities of imports (called tariff rate quotas, or TRQs), but higher (sometimes 
prohibitive) out-of-quota most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs. The Uruguay Round 
agreements also explicitly recognized domestic producer supports and export subsidies 
for farm products, and quantitative restrictions or prohibitions on imports for sanitary or 
phytosanitary reasons. So while in principle that set of multilateral agreements was 
expected to add to transparency, in practice it remains very difficult to quickly identify 
the extent of distortions to agricultural prices and their changes over time.   
An identification difficulty exists even for tariffs themselves. In tariffying, not 
only did countries choose to set specific (e.g., $x/kg) rather than or in addition to ad 
valorem (percent) tariffs,
2 but most bound their out-of-quota tariffs in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at rates well above those actually being applied. The URAA also 
provides a special safeguard mechanism for farm products to allow import surges to be 
curtailed. Thus almost all WTO members retain the freedom to raise applied rates at will 
– in some cases by several orders of magnitude. Furthermore, most countries offer 
preferential tariff rates to a subset of supplying countries. Some provide that formally as 
TRQs, while many others do it via bilateral and regional trading agreements. Still others 
offer non-reciprocal preferential market access to select developing countries such as 
under the European Union’s programs for so-called African, Caribbean and Pacific Island 
(ACP) countries and for all least-developed countries (under the ‘everything but arms’ 
program). Typically these discriminatory agreements have complex rules of origin that 
raise the cost of accessing the preferences, sometimes to prohibitive levels. Clearly, with 
differing in-quota and out-of-quota tariff rates for agricultural products, many of them 
specific or compound rather than just ad valorem, and with a wide array of preferential 
bilateral tariffs in place in most countries, there is no obvious single tariff rate that can 
                                                 
2 Specific tariffs offer (a) more protection against lower-priced substitutes, (b) growing protection against 
imports whose price is trending downwards over time, and (c) opaqueness because its ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE) is not evident from the tariff schedule without recourse to cif unit import value data. If ad 
valorem tariff cutting formulae are to be used in negotiating trade agreements, as under the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), agreement first has to be reached on what border price to use to calculate the 
specific tariffs’ AVEs. In the DDA that took several months and many meetings during 2005.    3
serve as a measure of protection actually delivered to any particular industry. Indeed, the 
marginal rate is likely to vary though time as market circumstances change even when the 
various set rates themselves are not changed.  
  The continuing importance also of agricultural nontariff import barriers, 
especially in the light of the emerging food regulations discussed in Josling, Roberts and 
Orden (2004), and the continuing use of agricultural production, consumption and export 
subsidies and taxes, the availability of the special safeguard mechanism, and the use of 
occasional quantitative export restrictions and prohibitions (as used for food staples in 
2008 by numerous developing countries seeking to insulate their food consumers from a 
major rise in food prices in international markets), mean that the only sure way to 
measure the actual distortions to farmer and consumer prices in any country is through 
careful domestic-to-international price comparisons. This is indeed what the OECD 
Secretariat has been doing systematically for the past two decades in generating producer 
support estimates and consumer subsidy equivalents (PSEs and CSEs) for the key farm 
products of high-income countries (OECD 2007a, 2007c) and five non-EU developing 
countries (OECD 2007b). But there has been no such similar comprehensive price-
comparison exercise undertaken for developing countries. The seminal multi-country 
study by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1991), for the period from around 1960 to 
1984, was for just 15 of today’s non-OECD countries plus Korea, Portugal and Turkey. 
That K/S/V study had the virtue of also estimating the indirect impact on agricultural 
incentives of distortions to non-agricultural prices (e.g., through manufacturing tariffs or 
NTBs) and to the domestic prices of foreign currencies via fixed and multiple exchange 
rates. It found that, at least up to the mid-1980s, incentives facing farmers in developing 
countries typically were depressed by government policies, in contrast to the situation in 
most OECD countries. It is unclear how much that situation has changed over the past 
two decades in which many developing countries have begun to reform their agricultural 
and trade policies. 
This suggests the need for new empirical analysis aimed at systematic estimation 
of overall actual delivered rates of distortion to domestic prices for agricultural and food 
products from policy interventions affecting both agricultural and non-agricultural 
markets. The core of this paper addresses the methodological issues that need to be faced   4
when attempting to undertake such a measurement task in developing countries. This 
approach is being used in a new research project convened by the World Bank that is 
applying it in more than 40 developing countries and in Europe’s transition economies 
that, together with the OECD countries, account for around 90 percent of global 
agricultural production, employment and trade (see www.worldbank.org/agdistortions). 
The focus is on those border and domestic measures that are due exclusively to 
governments’ actions, and as such can be altered by a political decision and have an 
immediate effect on consumer choices, producer resource allocation, and net farm 
incomes. Most commonly these are import or export taxes, subsidies and quantitative 
restrictions for farm and non-farm products, supplemented by direct domestic taxes or 
subsidies for farm outputs or inputs and food consumer subsidies or taxes.  
The incentives faced by farmers are affected not only by direct protection or 
taxation of primary agricultural industries but also indirectly via policies assisting non-
agricultural industries, since the latter can have an offsetting effect by drawing resources 
away from farming. While those non-agricultural measures may be of only minor 
importance in most OECD countries today, and therefore have been ignored by the 
OECD Secretariat in generating their PSEs and CSEs for those countries,
3 they have been 
too important in developing countries over the past half-century to ignore. Another 
difference between the OECD’s methodology (see OECD 2007c) and what is required for 
examining developing country policies, especially prior to the 1990s, has to do with 
exchange rate policies: they cannot be ignored as they have had a substantial distortionary 
impact on agricultural incentives in many developing countries. However, we suggest 
they be treated somewhat differently than in Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1991), 
focusing on the differential impact across commodities of dual or multiple exchange rates 
rather than on overall real exchange rate misalignment. This ensures the indicators we 
provide for distortions to prices of individual commodities can be direct price-wedge 
inputs into the database of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Such models 
can then be used to estimate the effects of those distortions on such things as resource 
                                                 
3 Australia, like New Zealand, is an exception, and both have been more like developing countries in that 
until recently their high manufacturing tariffs have heavily discouraged agricultural production (Anderson, 
Lloyd and MacLaren 2007).   5
allocation, welfare, income distribution and the real exchange rate (that is, the 
endogenously determined price of tradables relative to nontradables). 
The paper begins by outlining what theory suggests should be measured directly 
and indirectly to obtain indicators of the extent of distortions. It then outlines how that 
theory has been put into practice in the World Bank’s current research project. To 
illustrate, a summary of two types of results being generated by that project are presented: 
one involves presenting estimates of the changing extent of distortions for one important 
country, namely China for the period 1981 to 2005; the other is a summary of new 
estimates from a global economy-wide CGE model of the effects on agricultural versus 
non-agricultural markets of the project’s measured distortions as of 2004. The final 
section offers some concluding comments. 
 
What theory suggests should be measured 
 
The key purpose of distortion estimates of the sort being generated by the World Bank 
project is to provide a long annual time series of indicators showing the extent to which 
price incentives faced by farmers and food consumers have been distorted directly and 
indirectly by own-government policies in all major developing, transition and high-
income countries, and hence for the world as a whole (taking international prices as 
given). We follow the Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) concept of a market policy 
distortion as something that governments impose to create a gap between the marginal 
social return to a seller and the marginal social cost to a buyer in a transaction. Such a 
distortion creates an economic cost to society which can be estimated using welfare 
measures techniques such as those pioneered by Harberger (1971). As Harberger notes, 
this focus allows a great simplification in evaluating the marginal costs of a set of 
distortions: changes in economic costs can be evaluated taking into account the changes 
in volumes directly affected by such distortions, ignoring all other changes in prices. In 
the absence of divergences such as externalities, the measure of a distortion is the gap 
between the price paid and the price received, irrespective of whether the level of these 
prices is affected by the distortion.   6
Other developments that change incentives facing producers and consumers can 
include flow-on consequences of the distortion, but these should not be confused with the 
direct price distortion that we aim to estimate. If, for instance, a country is large in world 
trade for a given commodity, imposition of an export tax may raise the price in 
international markets, reducing the adverse impact of the distortion on producers in the 
taxing country. Another flow-on consequence is the effect of trade distortions on the real 
exchange rate, which is the price of traded goods relative to non-traded goods. Neither of 
these flow-on effects are of immediate concern, however, because if the direct distortions 
are accurately estimated, they can be incorporated as price wedges into an appropriate 
country or global economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which in 
turn will be able to capture the full general equilibrium impacts (inclusive of real 
exchange rate effects) of the various direct distortions to producer and consumer prices. 
Importantly, the total effect of distortions on the agricultural sector will depend 
not just on the size of the direct agricultural policy measures, but also on the magnitude 
of distortions generated by direct policy measures altering incentives in non-agricultural 
sectors. It is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect 
producers’ incentives. In a two-sector model an import tax has the same effect on the 
export sector as an export tax: the Lerner (1936) Symmetry Theorem. This carries over to 
a model that has many sectors, and is unaffected if there is imperfect competition 
domestically or internationally or if some of those sectors produce only non-tradables 
(Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). The symmetry theorem is therefore also relevant for 
considering distortions within the agricultural sector. In particular, if import-competing 
farm industries are protected, for example via import tariffs, this has similar effects on 
incentives to produce exportables as does an explicit tax on agricultural exports; and if 
both measures are in place, this is a double imposition on farm exports. 
In what follows, we begin by focusing first on direct distortions to agricultural 
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Direct agricultural distortions 
Consider a small, open, perfectly competitive national economy with many firms 
producing a homogeneous farm product with just primary factors. In the absence of 
externalities, processing, producer-to-consumer wholesale plus retail marketing margins, 
exchange rate distortions, and domestic and international trading costs, that country 
would maximize national economic welfare by allowing both the domestic farm product 
price and the consumer price of that product to equal E  times  P , where E  is the 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange and P  is the foreign currency price of this 
identical product in the international market. That is, any government-imposed diversion 
from that equality, in the absence of any market failures or externalities, would be 
welfare-reducing for that small economy. 
 
Price-distorting trade measures at the national border 
The most common distortion is an ad valorem tax on competing imports (usually 
called a tariff),  . Such a tariff on imports is the equivalent of a production subsidy and a 
consumption tax both at rate  . If that tariff on the imported primary agricultural product 
is the only distortion, its effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal 
rate of assistance to farm output conferred by border price support (NRABS), which is the 
unit value of production at the distorted price less its value at the undistorted free market 
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The effect of that import tariff on consumer incentives in this simple economy is 
to generate a consumer tax equivalent (CTE) on the agricultural product for final 
consumers: 
m t CTE = ) 2 ( 
The effects of an import subsidy are identical to those in equations (1) and (2) for 
an import tax, but   in that case would have a negative value.   m t
                                                 
4 The NRA thus differs from the producer support estimate (PSE) as calculated by the OECD, in that the 
PSE is expressed as a fraction of the distorted value. It is thus  ) 1 /( m m t t +  and so for a positive   it is 
smaller than the NRA and is necessarily less than 100 percent. 
m t  8
 
Governments sometimes also intervene with an export subsidy   (or an export 
tax in which case   would be negative). If that were the only intervention: 
x s
x s
x BS s CTE NRA = = ) 3 (  
 
If any of these trade taxes or subsidies were specific rather than ad valorem (e.g., 
$y/kg rather than z percent), its ad valorem equivalent can be calculated using slight 
modifications of equations (1), (2) and (3). 
 
Domestic producer and consumer price-distorting measures 
Governments sometimes intervene with a direct production subsidy for farmers, 
 (or production tax, in which case   is negative, including via informal taxes in kind 
by local and provincial governments). In that case, if only this distortion is present, the 
effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal rate of assistance to farm 
output conferred by domestic price support (NRADS), which is as above except   
replaces   or  , but the CTE  in that case is zero. Similarly, if the government just 
imposes a consumption tax   on this product (or consumption subsidy, in which case   
is negative), the CTE  is as above except   replaces   or  , but the  in that case 
is zero.  
f s f s
f s
m t x s
c c c c
c c m t x s DS NRA
The combination of domestic and border price support provides the total rate of 
assistance to output,    . o NRA
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What if the exchange rate system also is distorting prices? 
Should a multi-tier foreign exchange rate regime be in place, then another policy-induced 
price wedge exists. A simple two-tier exchange rate system creates a gap between the 
price received by all exporters and the price paid by all importers for foreign currency, 
changing both the exchange rate received by exporters and that paid by importers from   9
the equilibrium rate E  that would prevail without this distortion in the domestic market 
for foreign currency (Bhagwati 1978).   
Exchange rate overvaluation of the type we consider here requires controls by the 
government on current account transfers. A common requirement is that exporters 
surrender their foreign currency earnings to the central bank for exchange to local 
currency at a low official rate. This is equivalent to a tax on exports to the extent that 
official rate is below what the exchange rate would be in a market without government 
intervention. That implicit tax on exporters reduces their incentive to export and hence 
the supply of foreign currency flowing into the country. With less foreign currency, 
demanders are willing to bid up its purchase price. That provides a potential rent for the 
government, which can be realized by auctioning off the limited supply of foreign 
currency extracted from exporters or creating a legal secondary market. Either 
mechanism will create a gap between the official and parallel rates. 
Such a dual exchange rate system is depicted in Figure 1, in which is it assumed 
that the overall domestic price level is fixed, perhaps by holding the money supply 
constant (Dervis, de Melo and Robinson 1981). The supply of foreign exchange is given 
by the upward sloping schedule,  , and demand by  , where the official exchange 
rate facing exporters is   and the secondary market rate facing importers is  . At the 
low rate  , only   units of foreign currency are available domestically, instead of the 
equilibrium volume   that would result if exporters were able to exchange at the 
“equilibrium rate” 
fx S fx D
0 E m E
0 E S Q
E Q
E  units of local currency per unit of foreign currency.
5 The gap 
between the official and the secondary market exchange rates is an indication of the 
magnitude of the tax imposed on trade by the two-tier exchange rate: relative to the 
equilibrium rate E , the price of importables is raised by  E e E E m m × = − ) ( , while the 
price of exportables is reduced by  E e E E x × = − ) ( 0 , where   and   are the fractions  m e x e
                                                 
5 “Equilibrium” in the sense of what would prevail without this distortion in the domestic market for 
foreign currency. In the diagram, and in the discussion that follows, the equilibrium exchange rate E  
exactly balances the supply and demand for foreign currency. Taken literally, this implies a zero balance on 
the current account. The approach here can readily be generalized to accommodate exogenous capital flows 
and transfers, which would shift the location of  . With constant-elasticity supply and demand curves all 
of the results would carry through, and any exogenous change in those capital flows or transfers would 
imply a shift in the   or   curves. 
E Q
fx D fx S  10
by which the two-tier exchange rate system raises the domestic price of the importable 
and lowers the domestic price of the exportable, respectively. The estimated division of 
the total foreign exchange distortion between an implicit export tax,  , and an implicit 




6 If the demand and supply curves in Figure 1 had the same slope, 
then   =   and   is the secondary market premium or proportional rent 
extracted by the government or its agents.
m e x e ) ( x m e e +
7 
If the government chooses to allocate the limited foreign currency to different 
groups of importers at different rates, that is called a multiple exchange rate system. 
Some lucky importers may even be able to purchase it at the low official rate. The more 
that is allocated and sold to demanders whose marginal valuation is below  , the 
greater the unsatisfied excess demand at   and hence the stronger the incentive for an 
illegal or ‘black’ market to form, and for less-unscrupulous exporters to lobby the 
government to legalize the secondary market for foreign exchange and to allow exporters 
to retain some fraction of their exchange rate earnings for sale in the secondary market. 
Providing such a right to exporters to retain and sell a portion of foreign exchange 
receipts increases their incentives to export, and thereby reduces the shortage of foreign 
exchange and hence the secondary market exchange rate (Tarr 1990). In terms of Figure 
1, the available supply increases from   to  , bringing down the secondary rate from 











                                                 
6 From the viewpoint of wanting to use the   and   estimates later as parameters in a CGE 
model, it does not matter what assumptions are made here about these elasticities, as the CGE model’s 
results for real variables will not be affected. What matters for real impacts is the magnitude of the total 
distortion, not its allocation between an export tax and an import tax: the traditional incidence result from 
tax theory that also applies to trade taxes (Lerner 1936). For an excellent general equilibrium treatment, 
using an early version of the World Bank’s 1-2-3 Model, see de Melo and Robinson (1989).  
NRA CTE
7 Note that this same type of adjustment could be made where the government forces exporters to surrender 
all foreign currency earnings to the domestic commercial banking system and importers to buy all foreign 
currency needs from that banking system where that system is allowed by regulation to charge excessive 
fees. This apparently occurs in, for example, Brazil, where the spread is reputedly 12 percent. If actual costs 
in a non-distorted competitive system are only 2 percent (as they are in the less-distorted Chilean 
economy), the difference of 10 points could be treated as the equivalent of a 5 percent export tax and a 5 
percent import tax applying to all tradables (but, as with non tariff barriers, there would be no government 
tariff revenue but rather rent, in this case accruing to commercial banks rather than to the central bank). 
This is an illustration of the point made by Rajan and Zingales (2004) of the power of financial market 
reform in expanding opportunities.    11
exporters is   (the weights being the retention rate 
'
x E r  and  ) 1 ( r − ). Again, if the demand 
and supply curves in Figure 1 had the same slope, then the implicit export and import 
taxes resulting from this regime would be each equal to half the secondary market 
premium. 
In the absence of a secondary market and with multiple rates for importers below 
, a black market often emerges. Its rate will be above  m E E  by more the more the 
government sells its foreign currency to demanders whose marginal valuation is below 
 and the more active is the government in catching and punishing exporters selling in 
that illegal market. If the black market was allowed to operate ‘frictionlessly’ there would 
be no foreign currency sales to the government at the official rate and the black market 
rate would fall to the equilibrium rate 
m E
E . So even though in the latter case the observed 
premium would be positive (equal to the proportion by which E  is above nominal 
official rate  ), there would be no distortion. For present purposes, since the black 
market is not likely to be completely ‘frictionless’, it can be thought of as similar to the 
system involving a retention scheme. In terms of Figure 1,   would be the black market 
rate for a proportion of sales and the weighted average of that and   would be the 
exporters’ return. Calculating   in this case (and hence being able to estimate the 
implicit export and import taxes associated with this regime) by using the same approach 
as in the case with no illegal market thus requires not only knowing   and the black 








r , of sales in that black market. 
In short, where a country has distortions in its domestic market for foreign 
currency, the exchange rate relevant for calculating the   or   for a particular 
tradable product depends, in the case of a dual exchange rate system, on whether the 
product is an importable or an exportable, while in the case of multiple exchange rates it 
depends on the specific rate applying to that product each year. 
NRA CTE
 
What about real exchange rate changes? 
A change in the real exchange rate alters equally the prices of exportables and 
importables relative to the prices of non-traded goods. Such a change can arise for many   12
different reasons, including changes in the availability of capital inflows, macroeconomic 
policy adjustments, or changes in the terms of trade. When the economy receives a 
windfall – such as a greater inflow of foreign exchange from remittances or foreign aid or 
a commodity boom – the community moves to a higher indifference curve (Collier and 
Gunning 1998). While net imports of traded goods can change in response to this inflow 
of foreign exchange, the domestic supply of and demand for non-traded goods must 
balance. The equilibrating mechanism is the price of non-traded goods. The price of non-
traded goods rises to bring forth the needed increase in the supply of non-traded goods, 
and to reduce the demand for these goods to bring it into line with supply (Salter 1959).  
While this type of change in the real exchange rate affects the incentive to 
produce traded goods, it is quite different from distortions in the market for foreign 
currency analyzed above, in two respects. First, the incentives to produce importable and 
exportable goods are reduced to the same degree by this real exchange rate appreciation. 
In contrast with the multiple-tier exchange rate case, that appreciation does not generate 
any change in the prices of exportables relative to importables. Second, most such 
changes do not involve direct economic distortions of the type measurable using tools 
such as producer or consumer surplus. If the government, or the private sector, chooses to 
borrow more from abroad to increase domestic spending, this may raise the real exchange 
rate, but such an outcome is not obviously a distortion. Moreover, symmetric treatment of 
any such “overvaluation” during periods of high foreign borrowing would require taking 
into account exchange rate “undervaluation” during periods of low foreign borrowing or 
repayment of foreign debt. For these reasons, we do not follow Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes (1988) and Orden et al. (2007) in including deviations of real exchange rates from 
benchmark values. Rather, we only include deviations arising from direct distortions in 
the market for foreign currency such as via multiple exchange rate system.  
 
What if trade costs are sufficiently high for the product to be not traded internationally? 
Suppose the transport costs of trading are sufficient to make it unprofitable for a product 
to be traded internationally, such that the domestic price fluctuates over time within the 
band created by the cif import price and the fob export price. Then any trade policy 
measure (  or  ) or the product-specific exchange rate distortion (e.g.,   or  ) is  m t x s m e x e  13
redundant. In that case, in the absence of other distortions,  0 = o NRA , and the  0 = CTE . 
However, in the presence of any domestic producer or consumer tax or subsidy (  or  ) 
the domestic prices faced by both producers and consumers will be affected. The extent 
of the impact depends on the price elasticities of domestic demand and supply for the 
non-tradable (the standard closed-economy tax incidence issue).  
f s c t
To give a specific example, suppose just a production tax is imposed on farmers 
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What if farm production involves not just primary factors but also intermediate inputs? 
Where intermediate inputs are used in farm production, any taxes or subsidies on their 
production, consumption or trade would alter farm value added and thereby also affect 
farmer incentives. Sometimes a government will have directly offsetting measures in 
place, such as a domestic subsidy for fertilizer use by farmers but also a tariff on fertilizer 
imports. In other situations there will be farm input subsidies but an export tax on the 
final product.
9 In principle all these items could be brought together to calculate an 
effective rate of direct assistance to farm value added (ERA). The nominal rate of direct 
                                                 
8 As in the two-tier exchange rate case, the elasticities are used merely to identify the incidence of these 
measures: as long as both the NRAo and the CTE are included in any economic model used to assess the 
impact of the production tax, the real impacts will depend only on the magnitude of the total distortion, sf , 
not on the estimated NRA and CTE. 
9 On this general phenomenon of offsetting distortions for outputs and inputs (and even direct payments or 
taxes), see Rausser (1982).   14
assistance to farm output, NRAo, is a component of that, as is the sum of the nominal rates 
of direct assistance to all farm inputs, call it NRAi. In principle, all three rates can be 
positive or negative. To estimate ERAs requires knowing each product’s value added 
share of output though. Such data are not available for most developing countries even 
every few years, let alone for every year in the time series. And in most developing 
countries distortions to farm inputs are very small compared with distortions to farm 
output prices, and those purchased inputs are a small fraction of the value of output. But 
where there are significant distortions to input costs, their ad valorem equivalent can be 
accounted for by summing each input’s NRA times its input-output coefficient to obtain 
the combined NRAi, and adding that to the farm industry’s nominal rate of direct 
assistance to farm output, NRAo, to get the total nominal rate of assistance to farm 
production, call it simply NRA:
 10 
 
i o NRA NRA NRA + = ) 7 (.   
 
What about post-farmgate costs?  
If a state trading corporation is charging excessively for its marketing services and 
thereby lowering the farm-gate price of a product, for example as a way of raising 
government revenue in place of an explicit tax, the extent of that excess should be treated 
as if it is a tax. 
Some farm products, including some that are not internationally traded, are inputs 
into a processing industry that may also be subject to government interventions. In that 
case the effect of those interventions on the price received by farmers for the primary 
product also needs to be taken into account.  
 
The mean and standard deviation of agricultural NRAs 
It is helpful to generate a weighted average  for covered products for each country 
and to add the  for non-covered products to get the  for all agriculture. When it 
NRA
NRA NRA
                                                 
10 Bear in mind that a fertilizer plant or livestock feedmix plant might be enjoying import tariff protection 
that raises the domestic price of fertilizer or feedmix to farmers by more than any consumption subsidy (as 
had been the case for fertilizer in Korea – Anderson 1983), in which case the net contribution of this set of 
input distortions to the total NRA for agriculture would be negative.   15
comes to averaging across countries, each polity is an observation of interest, so a simple 
(unweighted) average for the focus countries is meaningful for the purpose of political 
economy analysis. But if one wants a sense of how distorted is agriculture in a whole 
region, a weighted average is needed. The weighted average   for covered primary 
agriculture can be generated by multiplying each primary industry’s value share of 
production (valued at the farm-gate equivalent undistorted prices) by its 
corresponding  and adding across industries.
NRA
NRA
11 The overall sectoral rate, which we 
denote , can be obtained by adding also actual or assumed information for the 
non-covered commodities. When appropriate, the aggregate value of non-product-
specific assistance to agriculture is added too. 
NRAag
A weighted average can be similarly generated for the tradables part of agriculture – 
including those industries producing products such as milk and sugar that require only 
light processing before they can be traded – by assuming that its share of non-product-
specific assistance equals its weight in the total. Call that  .  
t NRAag
In addition to the mean, it is important to provide also a measure of the variability 
of the NRA estimates across the covered products. The cost of government policy 
distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation are greater the greater the 
degree of substitution in production (Lloyd 1974). In the case of agriculture which 
involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm 
activities, the greater the variation of   across industries within the sector then the 
higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of that 




Trade bias in agricultural assistance 
A trade bias index also is needed, to indicate the changing extent to which a country’s 
policy regime has an anti-trade bias within the agricultural sector. This is important 
because, as mentioned in the theory section above, the Lerner (1936) Symmetry Theorem 
                                                 
11 Corden (1971) proposed that free-trade volume be used as weights, but since they are not observable (and 
an economy-wide model is needed to estimate them) the common practice is to compromise by using actual 
distorted volumes but undistorted unit values or, equivalently, distorted values divided by (1+ NRA). If 
estimates of own-and cross-price elasticities of demand and supply are available, a partial equilibrium 
estimate of the quantity at undistorted could be generated, but if those estimated elasticities are unreliable 
this may introduce more error than it seeks to correct.   16
demonstrates that a tariff assisting import-competing farm industries has a similar effect 
to a tax on agricultural exports; and if both measures are in place, this is a double 
imposition on farm exports. The higher is the nominal rate of assistance to import-
competing agricultural production ( ) relative to that for exportable farm 
activities ( ), the more incentive producers in that sub-sector will have bid for 




Once each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of 
exportables, or as producing a non-tradable (with its status sometimes changing over the 
years), it is possible to generate for each year the weighted average   for the two 
different groups of tradable farm industries. They can then be used to generate an 


















where   and   are the average   for the import-competing and 
exportables parts of the agricultural sector (their weighted average being  ). This 
index has a value of zero when the import-competing and export sub-sectors are equally 
assisted, and its lower bound approaches -1 in the most extreme case of an anti-trade 
policy bias.  
m NRAag x NRAag NRAs
t NRAag
 
Indirect agricultural assistance/taxation via non-agricultural distortions  
In addition to direct assistance to or taxation of farmers, the Lerner (1936) Symmetry 
Theorem further demonstrates that their incentives are also affected indirectly by 
government assistance to non-agricultural production in the national economy. The 
higher is the nominal rate of assistance to non-agricultural production ( ), the 
more incentive producers in other sectors will have bid up the value of mobile resources 
that would otherwise have been employed in agriculture, other things equal. If   is 
below  , one might expect there to be fewer resources in agriculture than there 




assistance to farmers, and conversely if  . A weighted average can 
be generated for the tradables part of non-agriculture too, call it  . 
NRAnonag NRAag >
t NRAnonag
One of the most important negative effects on farmers is protection from import 
competition for industrialists. Tariffs are part of that, but so too – especially in past 
decades – are non-tariff barriers to imports. Other primary sectors (fishing, forestry and 
minerals and energy raw material extraction) on average tend to be subject to less direct 
distortions than either agriculture or manufacturing, but there are important exceptions. 
One example is a ban on logging, but if such a ban is for genuine natural resource 
conservation reasons it should be ignored. Another example is a resource rent tax on 
minerals. Unlike an export tax or quantitative restriction on exports of such raw materials 
(which are clearly distortive and would need to be included in the   for mining), a 
resource rent tax, like a land tax, can be fairly benign in terms of resource re-allocation 
(see Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 1983) and so can be ignored. 
NRA
The largest part of most economies is the services sector. It produces mostly non-
tradables, many of them by the public sector. Distortions in services markets have proven 
to be extraordinarily difficult to measure, and no systematic estimates across countries are 
available even for a recent period, let alone over time. One way forward in generating 
time series estimates of   is to assume all services are non-tradable and that 
they, along with other non-agricultural non-tradables, face no distortions. All the other 
non-agricultural products can be separated into exportables and import-competing 
products for estimating correctly their weighted average  , including via multiple 
exchange rates, so as to generate  in the same way as discussed above for their 
the calculation of  . Ideally production valued at border prices should be used as 






Assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural production 
Given the calculation of   and   as above, it is then possible to 
calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance, 
t NRAag
t NRAnonag
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Since an   cannot be less than -1 if producers are to earn anything, neither can the  NRA
RRA. This measure is a useful indicator for providing international comparisons over 
time of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti- or pro-agricultural bias. 
 
Putting the theory into practice  
 
Making the above theory operational in the real world, where data are often scarce 
especially over a long time period is as much an art as a science.
12 Thankfully one does 
not have to start from scratch in many countries. Nominal rates of assistance are available 
from as early as 1955 in some cases, and at least from the mid-1960s, to the early or mid-
1980s for the 18 countries included in Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1992) and 
Anderson and Hayami (1986). Much has been done to provide detailed estimates since 
1986 of direct distortions to farmer (though not food processing) incentives in the high-
income countries that are now members of the OECD, and (since the early or mid-1990s) 
in selected European transition economies and Brazil, China and South Africa (OECD 
2007a,b). As well, at least for direct distortions, the K/S/V measures have been updated 
to the mid-1990s for some Latin American countries (Valdes 1996) and provided also for 
some East European countries (Valdes 2000); and a new set of estimates of simplified 
PSEs for a few key farm products for China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam since 1985 are 
now available from IFPRI (Orden et al. 2007). Each of these studies uses variations on 
the above methodology, but the basic price data at least, as well as the narratives attached 
to those estimates, are invaluable springboards for the present study.  
 
Farm product coverage 
The agricultural commodity coverage includes all the major food items plus other key 
farm products (e.g., tree crop products, tobacco, cotton, wool), with the aim of reaching 
70 percent of each country’s value of agricultural and food production at undistorted 
farm-gate prices. Priority is given to the most-distorted industries, because then the 
residual will have not only a low weight but also a low degree of distortion. 
                                                 
12 In addition to the methodologies of Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1991) and the OECD (2006) for 
estimating agricultural distortion and producer support indicators, see the recent review of methodologies 
of other previous studies by Josling and Valdes (2004).    19
Each product is explicitly identified as import-competing, exporting or non-
tradable. For many products that categorization changes over time, in some cases moving 
monotonically through those three categories and, in others, fluctuating in and out of non-
tradability. Hence an indication of a product’s net trade status is given each year rather 
than just one categorization for the whole time series; and it is determined by what the 
status would be in the absence of the distortions to incentives that are being measured 
(Byerlee and Morris 1993). For large-area countries with high internal and coastal 
shipping costs, some regions within that country may be exporting abroad even while 
other regions are net importers from other countries. In such cases it is necessary to 
estimate separate   for each region and then generate a national weighted average.   NRAs
 
Farm input coverage 
The range of input subsidies considered in any particular country study will depend on 
the degree of distortions in that country’s input markets. In addition to fertilizer, the other 
large ones are likely to be electric or diesel power, pesticides and credit (including 
occasionally large-scale debt forgiveness, as in Brazil and Russia, although how that is 
spread beyond the year of forgiveness is problematic).
13 There are also distortions to 
water, but the task of measuring water subsidies is especially controversial and complex 
so they are not included in our   calculations (just as the OECD has ignored them in 
its PSE calculations). Similarly, distortions to land and labor markets are excluded, apart 
from qualitative discussion in the analytical narrative of some country case studies. 
NRA
 
Price distortions due to multiple exchange rates  
If there are no exchange rate distortions the official exchange rate is used. However, 
when a dual exchange rate system is in place a parallel market rate (which could be the 
black market rate if no legal secondary market exists) is reported along with an estimate 
of the proportion of foreign currency which is actually sold by exporters at the parallel 
market rate. This is the formal retention rate where an official dual exchange regime is in 
place, or otherwise a guesstimate of the proportion traded on the black market (premia for 
which are provided by Easterly 2006). One can then compute an estimate for the 
                                                 
13 For an analysis of input subsidies in Indian agriculture, see Gulati and Narayanan (2003).   20
equilibrium exchange rate for the economy, which is the rate at which international prices 
are converted into local currency to compute each  . Relevant exchange rates for 
importers and exporters are also then able to be computed endogenously. If they are 
distorted away from the official exchange rate, the relevant exchange rate for importers 
and exporters, respectively, are the discounted parallel market rate and the weighted 
average of the official exchange rate and the discounted parallel rate according to the 
proportion of the exporter’s currency that is sold on the parallel market.  
NRA
If a multiple exchange rate system is in place and that system provides for a 
specific rate for a product that differs from the general rates calculated as above, then that 
industry-specific rate should be used. 
 
‘Guesstimates’ of NRAs for the non-covered agricultural products  
In calculating the weighted average rates of assistance for the whole sector,   have 
to be ‘guesstimated’ for the 30 percent or so of the value of agricultural products for 
which price comparisons are not calculated. The OECD in its PSE work assumes the not-
measured part has the same market price support as the average of the measured part. An 
alternative default is to assume the rates are zero. Orden et al. (2007) show that these two 
alternatives produce significantly different results for India, so it is preferable to make 
informed judgments for the import-competing, exporting and non-tradable parts of the 
residual group of farm products and then calculate their weighted average (again using 
the value of production at undistorted prices as weights).  
NRAs
 
Non-product-specific assistance to agriculture 
If there are non-product-specific forms of agricultural subsidies or taxes in addition to 
product-specific ones, that cannot even be allocated as between importables, exportables 
and non-tradables, these can be included in the   in the same way (as a percentage 
of the total value of production) as done for these types of interventions in the calculation 
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Dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation 
For simplifying the presentation of results below, the , CTE , and  NRA RRA are 
expressed as percentages rather than proportions. It is also helpful to multiply the   
by the gross value of production at undistorted prices to obtain an estimate in current US 
dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of assistance to farmers, and to also divide 




An application: The case of China, 1981 to 2005 
 
What does the above methodology suggest has been the pattern of distortions to 
agricultural incentives in China following the launch of its reforms from the late 1970s? 
The evidence has been unclear to date, particularly because agricultural trade has been 
managed using a wide range of nontransparent policies including state trading, import 
licensing and quotas as well as tariffs. Hence there was a need for a more-thorough study, 
and one now has been made available by Huang, Liu, Martin and Rozelle (2007) using 
the above methodology. 
During the pre-reform socialist period, a key policy objective was to accelerate 
the rate of industrial development through direct and indirect transfers from agriculture. 
Another objective was to depress the prices of agricultural products to allow food to be 
made available at low prices to urban consumers—a pattern consistent with that observed 
in other low income countries (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988). In combination this meant the 
farm sector was taxed by the prices of agricultural goods being set for both farmers and 
food consumers below their market values and by prices of industrial goods being set 
above what would have been their free-market level. That policy involved total taxation 
of agriculture of an estimated 26 percent in 1957 and 27 percent in 1978, primarily from 
direct taxation of the prices of agricultural goods (Yao 1994, p. 138). 
In undertaking domestic-to-border price comparisons since the reforms began in 
1979, an important feature taken into account  by Huang et al. (2007)  is the fact that the 
official exchange rate had been greatly overvalued up to the mid-1990s and an active 
secondary or parallel market was operating. If one did not account for the dual exchange   22
rate regime that prevailed from the early 1980s until unification of the exchange rate in 
1994, price comparisons at the official exchange rate might suggest China has been 
protecting farmers. But using the method described above to account for distortions in the 
market for foreign currency (data for which are available from 1981), a quite different 
pattern emerges. Huang et al. provide new annual estimates of protection and taxation 
from 1981 to 2005 for 11 commodities: rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, cotton, pork, milk, 
poultry, fruit (using apples as a representative product), vegetables (using tomatoes as a 
representative product) and sugar (both sugar beet and sugar cane). Over their study 
period, these commodities accounted for between 70 and 90 percent of the total value of 
agricultural output in China. A summary of their key results is provided in Table 1.  
A striking feature of Table 1 is the extent to which producers were directly taxed 
by agricultural and trade policies in the early reform era. This was particularly the case 
for staple foods such as rice and maize. Taxation of rice reduced returns to farmers by 
over 50 percent relative to world price levels. Cotton prices were also strongly depressed, 
partly because of a desire to have low-cost inputs for the processing sector. Returns to 
other labor-intensive agricultural products such as vegetables and pork were depressed 
too, partly as a consequence of restrictions on exports. Returns to import-competing 
agricultural products were much less seriously depressed, and some of these products, 
such as sugar and milk, had quite high levels of positive protection. For these products, 
the goal of self-sufficiency, or at least concerns about vulnerability if grain imports 
reached double-digit shares of consumption, appear to have resulted in much lower levels 
of taxation. Assistance to agricultural exportables and to maize and cotton remained 
strongly negative in the late 1980s, while protection to imported commodities became 
slightly positive.  
In the first half of the 1990s, there were very important changes, including the 
abolition of the system of compulsory procurement of grains. The weighted average rate 
of taxation fell by half in this period, to just under 20 percent. However, key commodities 
such as rice, maize and cotton still had negative rates of assistance. In the late 1990s, the 
taxation of rice diminished greatly, and taxation of a range of other exportable goods   23
disappeared as export restrictions on these goods were removed.
14 Taxation of import-
oriented agriculture disappeared completely, to be replaced by significant agricultural 
protection. In part, this reflected the phase-out of the obligation for farmers to deliver a 
substantial amount of their output at below-market prices under the production quota 
system. Incentives for maize protection became positive in this period, with export 
subsidies applying in at least some years (Huang, Rozelle and Min 2004). Between 2000 
and 2005, direct taxation of agriculture became, on average, essentially zero, with the 
provision of positive assistance to producers of import-competing products and even 
some exportable goods. As part of that reform, the anti-trade bias in farm policies fell 
dramatically (the trade bias index for agriculture averaged more than -0.5 in the 1980s but 
is now less than -0.1). The gross subsidy equivalent of farmer assistance in the first half 
of this decade averaged US$16 billion per year ($32 per person employed in agriculture), 
in contrast to an effective tax of more than $60 billion ($140 per farmer) per year in the 
1980s. 
An equally important influence on the incentive environment for China’s 
agriculture has been protection to the non-agricultural sector. Protection to non-
agricultural tradable sectors imposes an implicit tax on the agricultural sector by drawing 
resources away from agriculture. As part of the process of WTO accession, protection 
rates to both agriculture and manufacturing in China were reduced substantially, and 
these reductions were locked in through legal tariff bindings in the WTO. The relative 
rate of assistance (RRA) estimates toward the bottom of Table 1, and depicted in Figure 
2, provide a summary measure that combines the effects of direct and indirect incentives. 
From Figure 2 it is clear that the combined effect of reductions in direct taxation of 
agriculture and its indirect taxation through protection to other sectors outweighed the 
effect of reductions in assistance to protected import-competing agricultural industries in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, and improved enormously the overall incentives for 
agricultural production in China. 
To see how much of the changes in the estimated NRAag, trade bias index and 
RRA are due to the dual exchange rate system that was in place until the early 1990s, the 
                                                 
14 Prices for these goods still tended to be below average prices in international markets, but this was more 
a consequence of foreign import barriers than of distortions imposed by China.    24
final three rows of Table 1 report what the estimates are if just the official exchange rate 
is used. In the 1980s, almost one-quarter of the NRAag, more than one-third of the (anti-
)trade bias index and one-sixth of the RRA were due to distortions to exchange rates in 
that decade. To have ignored that source of price distortion would have led to a 
considerable under-estimation of the adverse effect of past government policies on 
farmers’ incentives in China.  
The distortions to agricultural prices in China impacted not only on farmers but 
also on buyers of farm products. Even if one assumes that none of the government benefit 
from forcibly acquiring farm output at below-market prices was passed on to consumers 
(implying that the only consumer price distortion was that caused by border trade 
restrictions), the price of farm products to consumers was more than one-third below 
what it otherwise would have been in the early 1980s. That transfer fell to just under 20 
percent by the latter 1980s and 10 percent in the first half of the 1990s, but since then it 
has disappeared and consumers are effectively taxed by 2-4 percent on average now when 
expressed at the farm-gate level. The dispersion across products is very considerable 
though (although much less so than in the 1980s), with consumer prices of some items 
such as rice always being below market levels and others such as dairy, sugar and wheat 
always above market levels (Table 2). 
In summary, these new estimates suggest the anti-agricultural policy bias of the 
socialist era in China was very considerable, continued for some time in the post-reform 
period, was gradually reduced, and has now virtually disappeared on average. There 
remains some dispersion of NRAs and CTEs within the agricultural sector still, but even 
that has reduced considerably as part of the reform process (see the standard deviation 
row in Tables 1 and 2). A question for the future is: will China’s RRA stay around zero 
or, as happened in Japan, Korea and Taiwan (see Anderson and Hayami 1986), will 




   25
Another application: Using new price distortion measures to estimate their global 
effects on agricultural versus non-agricultural markets as of 2004 
 
The above estimates of distortions to agricultural prices for China, and similar ones for 
other developing countries, can be used in global economy wide computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. Most such CGE models depend on just applied tariffs 
supplemented by agricultural subsidies in high-income countries as measured by the 
OECD. These are collated and distributed as the GTAP Protection Database by the GTAP 
Center in Purdue University (www.gtap.org). The newly estimated average of distortions 
for China in 2004 is less than two-thirds the average of those in the latest version (the 
pre-release of Version 7.0) of the GTAP Protection Database. In particular, the 
production-weighted average tariff on imports of all agricultural and processed food 
products that year is 10.9 percent in the GTAP database, compared with just 6.8 percent 
based on the new estimates reported above (plus an average export subsidy for those 
products of 0.2 percent, compared with 0.0 percent in the GTAP database).  
These new numbers based on price comparisons for China, and similar ones for 
other developing countries in the project, are inevitably going to generate different 
national and global results than those based mainly on trade-weighted average tariff rates. 
When used in a global CGE model they are going to provide a better indication of what 
impact policies are having on output, trade and agricultural relative to non-agricultural 
value added than can be inferred simply from nominal and relative rates of assistance. A 
small sample of estimates of the effects of those price distortions, using the Linkage 
Model (see van der Mensbrugghe 2005) of the global economy, is provided in what 
follows, details of which are available in Anderson, Valenzuela and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2008). 
  With China (like much of Asia, Africa and Europe) having less agricultural 
comparative advantage than Latin America, and tending to protect its farmers more from 
import competition, it is not surprising that the model suggests an own-country reform 
that removes distortions to all goods markets causes farm output to decline in China. It 
would fall by US$4.8 billion per year, or 1.3 percent. However, China’s agricultural and 
food exports would expand (by $1.2 billion or 12 percent), while its imports of those   26
products would increase by $3.6 billion or 16 percent as farmers specialize would more 
(less) in those farm enterprises in which the country has a comparative advantage 
(disadvantage).  
Notice from Table 3 that if all other countries were to liberalize simultaneously 
with China, China’s farm output would expand (by 2 percent) rather than fall, and its 
exports of farm products would be four-fifths rather than just one-eighth greater. Its 
imports would be greater too, but by a much smaller margin (rising by 27 percent under 
global reform compared with the 16 percent rise under unilateral reform). That is, while 
China’s own policies are now slightly pro-agricultural, their positive effects on farmers 
less than fully offset the negative effect on farmers of agricultural protectionism abroad. 
This finding for China is not unlike that for developing countries as a group. If all 
countries/regions moved to free markets for all goods, more specialization would be 
encouraged. For developing countries as a whole, it would result in a 6 percent expansion 
in overall farm output and an almost doubling in their combined agricultural exports. 
Highly protected farmers in rich countries would reduce output though, and global farm 
output as of 2004 would be 2.4 percent less – while global farm trade would be 38 
percent larger.  
These global results suggest the current structure of goods market distortions is 
encouraging slightly more production of farm goods than is optimal globally, but far too 
many in rich countries and too few in developing countries. If those distortions were 
removed in all countries, the share of world agricultural and food production that is 
exported would nearly double, rising from 7 to 12 percent (while that for non-farm goods 
would rise only about 3 percentage points), and the developing country share of global 
farm exports would rise from 54 to 64 percent (Table 4).  
  The impact on value added in agriculture versus other sectors of the economy also 
is generated by the Linkage model. The negative of this provides a national general 
equilibrium counterpart to the partial equilibrium concept of the effective rate of 
assistance in the case of own-country reform scenarios, or its global general equilibrium 
counterpart in the case of a global reform scenario. Both are presented in Table 5. For 
China, removing distortions to its goods markets as of 2004 would reduce agricultural 
value added by 2.3 percent and raise value added in the rest of the economy by 0.6   27
percent, suggesting its own current distortions structure by 2004 was pro-agricultural. 
This is consistent with the NRA and RRA estimates in Table 1, but the modeling results 
also take into account the impact such a reform would have on China’s terms of trade 
internationally (since China is a non-trivial player in world markets for numerous goods). 
  If the rest of the world moved to free markets for all goods, on the other hand, 
agricultural value added in China would rise by 7.8 percent, while value added in the rest 
of its economy would rise by just 2.4 percent. Thus the rest of the world’s policies 
discriminate more against China’s farmers than against its producers of non-farm goods, 
according to these results (row 2 of Table 5).  
  If all countries were to reform simultaneously, the results are similar to but not 
quite the same as the sum of the above, because the effects on the international terms of 
trade are not additive. The lower part of Table 5 provides the value added results from 
global liberalization. For China, value added in agriculture would increase by 6.6 percent 
or by twice the percentage for non-agricultural sectors. The change in the rest of East 
Asia has the same bias but to a lesser extent. This compares with a much more pro-
agricultural outcome for Latin America, but contrasts with the bias in South Asia, Africa 
and Eastern Europe where non-agricultural value added would grow at the expense of 
farmers’ earnings. For developing countries as a whole, the bias of policies in 2004 was 
clearly against farmers, since their removal would boost net farm incomes by 5.2 percent 
while value added in other sectors would rise by just 2.1 percent (final row of Table 5). 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
With import tariffs on farm products continuing to provide an incomplete indication of 
the extent to which agricultural producer and consumer incentives are distorted in 
national markets (notwithstanding tariffication under the WTO’s Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture), monitoring of government policies causing those distortions 
remains a complex but necessary task. And for countries that have also distorted 
incentives for their producers of non-agricultural tradables, those too need to be 
monitored if impacts of policies on net farm incomes are required (for example, as an 
input into the poverty and inequality impacts of those policies). The NRA and RRA   28
measures described above provide perhaps the simplest way to estimate the extent to 
which agricultural and trade policies distort farmer incentives. And where an economy-
wide CGE model is available, those NRAs can be inserted in its database to estimate the 
effects of those price distortions on markets, income distribution and the like as well. 
Without NRAag estimates based on price comparisons, however, such CGE models are 
likely to rely just on import-weighted tariffs and thereby to generate misleading estimates 
of the effects of government interventions in goods markets.  
  One further point about the use of NRA estimates in CGE modeling is worth 
making by way of conclusion. CGE models are used to estimate the consequences not 
just of recent policies but also of possible changes in policies. In the case of China, they 
were used widely to assess the likely consequences of the commitments China made as 
part of its accession to WTO (one of many examples being by Ianchovichina and Martin 
(2004)). Such studies compare a projected reform scenario with a base case that typically 
assumes the current policy regime will continue into the future. In the case of agricultural 
policies, however, history reveals that countries tend to transform from taxing to assisting 
farmers relative to producers of other tradables as their economy develops. The extent of 
that transformation is particularly strong in densely populated countries as their 
comparative disadvantage in agriculture intensifies, as revealed in the World Bank 
project’s new estimates of NRAs for key Asian economies (Figure 3(a)). One might 
therefore anticipate that, in the absence of outside influences such as WTO accession, 
China might eventually follow the agricultural protectionist path of earlier-industrializing 
Japan and Korea. In that case, estimating the net present value of its legally bound 
commitments to reduce farm tariffs and subsidies as part of WTO accession arguably 
requires comparing that scenario with a base scenario involving a rising counterfactual 
NRA for agricultural products rather than simply assuming that the low level of recent 
years would prevail indefinitely. Imagine how much greater would have been the 
estimated benefits of signing on to the GATT had agricultural reform commitments been 
required at the time Japan joined in 1955 and Korea in 1967, in the light of the growth as 
revealed in Figure 3(b) of their agricultural NRAs since then. 
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Source: Martin (1993). See also Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1981), Kiguel and 
O’Connell (1995, 1997), and Shatc and Tarr (2000). Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradables, and 
relative rate of assistance,



















a The relative rate of assistance is calculated as  RRA = 
100[(100+NRAag)/(100+NRAnonag) - 1], where NRAag and NRAnonag are the 
nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradables, respectively. 
 
Source: Huang, Liu, Martin and Rozelle (2007).   2
Figure 3: Relative and nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, China and other Asian 
countries, 1955 to 2005 
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Source: Anderson (2008). Table 1: Nominal rates and gross subsidy equivalent of assistance to agricultural 
industries, China, 1981 to 2005 
(percent) 
 1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-05
Exportables
a  -58 -46 -22 -1 0
Rice -56 -34 -30 -7  -7
F r u i t s  - 2 9- 9- 4 0   0
Vegetables -42 -58 -22 0  0
Poultry 25 -27 -3 0  0
Pork -79 -49 -15 0  0
Import-competing goods
a  -12 19 2 19 10
W h e a t  22 21 13 0   4
Soybeans 1 1 5 30  16
Sugar 44 45 12 27  29
Milk 129 58 -4 18  25
Mixed trade status goods
a   
Maize -35 -16 -25 5  13
Cotton -34 -35 -26 -4  1
Weighted average NRA  
of above products
a  -51 -41 -19 2 1
  of which due to trade policy 
     intervention at the border:  -39 -35 -13 3  2
Standard deviation
ab 74 52 21 18  16
Trade bias index
h  -50 -55 -23 -15    -7 
Coverage of agric. sector
d   85 89 85 80 66
   
NRA, non-covered 
c products   -29 -15 -7 8 4
NRA, all agricultural products  -48 -38 -17 4 2
NRA from non-product-specific 
assistance to farmers   2233  4
Total Agricultural NRA 
(incl. non-product-specific) 
e -45 -36 -14 7  6
  Gross subsidy equiv (US$b)  -70 -56 -24 15 16
  GSE per farmer (US$)  -165 -121 -47 29 32
          
NRA, all non-agric. tradables   42 28 25 10 5
Relative Rate of Assistance
f  -61 -50 -31 -3 1
       
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate distortions:
g    
   NRA, all agric. products  -35 -27 -12 4 2
   Trade bias index, all agric  -33 38 -13 -15 -7
   Relative Rate of Assistance  -52 -41 -27 -3 1
 
1   2
a Nominal Rates of Assistance to farmers plus product-specific input subsidies weighted using the 
value of output at undistorted prices. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or 
import-competing groups depending upon their trade status in particular years. 
b The standard deviation shown is the simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation 
around the weighted mean.  
c Non-covered importables are assumed to be protected at 75 percent of the rate applied on 
covered products. Non-covered exportables are assumed to be protected or taxed at 80 percent of 
the rate applying to covered products.  
d Expressed as a percentage of agricultural production valued at undistorted prices.  
e Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary 
agricultural production at undistorted prices (%).
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
g These memo items show what the average NRAag, trade bias index and RRA would be if the 
distortions in the market for foreign currency, as captured by the project’s methodology, are 
ignored. 
h Trade bias index is TBI = 100*[(100+NRAagx)/(100+NRAagm) – 1], where NRAagm and 
NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of the 
agricultural sector. 
 
Source: Huang, Liu, Martin and Rozelle (2007).   3
Table 2: Consumer tax equivalent of policy distortions to agricultural prices, measured at 
the farmgate level, China, 1981 to 2005 
(percent) 
 
Crop 1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-05
   
Exportables -52.6 -30.7 -16.2 -1.1  0.9
Rice -29 -22 -19 -5  -3
Fruits -30 -12 -6 0  0
Vegetables -42 -58 -22 0  0
Poultry 27 -26 -2 0  0
Pork -75 -47 -15 0  0
   
Import-competing 0.2 37.9 12.5 17.1  8.0
Wheat 34 53 46 28  1
Soybeans 5 10 10 26  18
Sugar 63 65 28 43  47
Milk 127 58 -5 18  24
  
Mixed trade status
b       
Maize -9 16 -14 7  14
Cotton -36 -37 -29 -9  -3
       
Weighted average CTE  
of above products
a  -36.4 -19.6 -9.2 3.7 2.3
Standard deviation
c  71.2 51.5 24.8 19.6 18.7
 
a Consumer Tax Equivalents are weighted using the value of consumption at the farmgate 
level, measured at undistorted prices.  
 
b Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups 
depending upon their trade status in the particular year. 
 
c The standard deviation shown is the simple 5-year average of the annual standard 
deviation around the weighted mean.  
 
Source: Huang, Liu, Martin and Rozelle (2007). 
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Table 3: Impacts of China’s and global liberalization of goods markets on agricultural 
and food output and trade, by country/region, 2004 
 
(relative to benchmark data, in 2004 US$ billion and percent) 
 
   $bill. change rel. to baseline  % change relative to baseline 
  Output Exports Imports Output  Exports Imports 
Impact of own reform on:                
     China  -4.8 1.2 3.6 -1.3  12.1 16.4
  
Impact of global reform on:     
China 8.2 7.9 5.9 2.3  80.1 27.1
All Asia  21.9 36.5 23.9 2.3  78.9 37.7
All Latin America   92.3 75.7 7.9 21.9  112.8 32.6
All Africa  11.7 19.9 8.7 6.4  100.3 40.1
  
All developing countries  133.7 158.2 60.2 5.9  97.2 38.3
All high-income countries  -229.0 -11.4 86.6 -13.0  -5.0 37.1
  
World total  -95.3 146.7 146.7 -2.4  37.6 37.6
 
Source: Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2008).   5
 Table 4: Impact of full global liberalization of goods markets on shares of global output 
exported, and developing country shares of global output and exports









share of global output 
Developing countries' 
share of global 
exports
a 
   Benchmark 
Full Global 
liberalization  Benchmark 
Full Global 
liberalization  Benchmark 
Full Global 
liberalization 
Rice, milled  4 7 78 80 85 87
Wheat  14 19 75 78 27 40
Other grains  10 13 70 74 36 59
Oilseeds  20 27 70 75 54 70
Cotton  24 22 72 80 36 69
Vegetables and fruits  9 14 73 78 69 78
Other crops  11 14 53 53 76 62
Cattle and sheep  2 2 52 59 56 57
Other livestock  3 4 68 69 43 46
Wool  10 12 77 75 17 21
Beef and sheep meat  6 19 30 43 32 69
Other meats  6 11 34 37 45 48
Vegetable oils and fats  19 28 52 58 80 83
Dairy products  4 10 33 36 31 40
Sugar, refined  7 38 57 88 80 92
Other food, bev. &  tobacco  8 12 38 40 50 61
   
All agric & processed food  7 12 50 53 54 64
Other primary products  30 32 64 64 77 78
Textile and wearing apparel  27 34 55 58 75 76
Other manufacturing  24 26 37 37 49 50
Services  3 3 21 21 30 29
 
a Excluding intra-EU15 trade. 
 
Source: Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2008).   6
Table 5: Impacts of China’s and global liberalization of goods markets on agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectoral value added, 2004 
 
(relative to benchmark data) 
  
 
$billion change relative 
to baseline 











Impact on China of:     
          Own-country reform  -3.8 7.4 -2.3  0.6
              Rest-of world reform  12.8 29.6 7.8  2.4
   
Impact of global reform on:   
China 10.9 39.9 6.6  3.3
All East Asia   13.8 121.2 5.2  4.2
South Asia  -9.8 -0.3 -5.4  0.0
Africa -2.1 0.8 -2.2  0.1
Latin America   39.9 26.9 29.1  1.7
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  -5.6 6.5 -4.1  0.5
All developing countries  43.9 163.4 5.2 2.1
   
Source: Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2008). 